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Abstract
The upcoming demographic crisis in Germany demands fundamental
reforms of the pension system. In a democracy, reforms are, however, only
feasible when they are supported by the majority of the electorate. To
determine whether the majority is in favor of reforms of the pension system,
we calculate for each year the "indifference age" as the age of the cohort
which is not affected by the reform and the "median age" as the age of the
politically decisive cohort. Until 2023, the median age is below the
indifference age implying that the young have the majority and the reform
can be democratically enforced. After 2023, Germany will be characterized
by a gerontocratic system where the old decide over the young. Only the fear
that the young might emigrate – and perhaps a certain altruistic attitude
towards their own descendants – will prevent the old from exploiting the
young.
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Currently, for every ten Germans no more than seven children are born, and life expectancy
is increasing by one year every eight years. By the year 2035, the ratio of old to young will
have almost doubled and only then will the situation improve. Germans will have the oldest
population on earth already around 2030. These are the known facts which will lead to a cri-
sis of the pay-as-you-go pension system (Sinn 1999).






















































Legend: The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of people aged 60
or older to the number of people between 20 and 59.
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt (1994), own calculations.
In the political discussion, these dangers have been known for some time. But only in
the last years were serious attempts at a fundamental reform being undertaken. The reform4
of the pension system of 1992 avoided an increase of the contribution rate to 40% of wages.
1
With the benefit cuts which the German Bundestag passed in 1999 as part of the Riester-
Reform by restricting the growth of pension benefits in 2000 and 2001 to the inflation rate,
2
the increase in the contribution rate would have been limited to 26%, or 28%, depending on
the specific assumptions. The benefit cuts would have slowed down the increase in the con-
tribution rate, but the projected level would have been still ominously high. This reform has,
however, been suspended after the first year. So in 2001, pension benefits grow again in line
with wages net of tax.
Experts and many politicians agreed, however, that the increase in the contribution rate
must be further slowed down, making further cuts necessary. To compensate for these cuts,
many proposed building up a complementary funded system which every contributor fi-
nances via additional savings and this was exactly at the heart of the reform passed in spring
2001. From 2002 on, there will be a partial transition to a funded pension system combined
with a reduction of the non-funded part of the pension system. Private saving for old age will
be subsidized with about €10 billion a year at the final stage in order to make it attractive for
young individuals to build up a funded supplement to their reduced non-funded pension
claims. At the same time, recommended private saving will lower what is called “net wages”
in the pension formula and hence reduce contribution rates and pension benefits.
The crisis of the pension system mainly results from the fact that Germans no longer
have as many children as they used to. Instead of investing in human capital, they consume
the resources necessary to raise children otherwise. The few children born will contribute to
                                                
1 One of the main parts of the reform was to replace tying the pensions to the gross wage with tying
them to the net wage.
2 Besides, the state subsidy would increase financed by the newly introduced ecological tax on en-
ergy, petrol, oil, and gas.5
the pay-as-you-go system when joining the working population, but they will not be able to
maintain the pension benefits at the present level. Therefore, it is a reasonable approach to
smooth the burden of education expenditures and pension contributions over the generations
by investing the spared resources of the generations with few children into a funded pension
system (Sinn and Werding 2000).
Smoothing the burden over the generations will lead to cries of support or rejections,
depending on personal interests. This reform is only feasible in a democratic community
when the majority of the voters will benefit from the changes.
Whether one belongs to the losers or winners of the reform depends on age. In general,
older individuals will be among the losers and younger individuals among the winners. As
long as the young are in the majority, reforms which lead to a partially funded system can be
implemented. As soon as the elderly are in the majority, such reforms are no longer feasible.
They would defend the pension formula without taking the exorbitant burdens into account
which this system would imply for the working population. All the negative economic effects
of increasing social security contributions, which economic councils all over the world have
described for many years, would become reality. Germany's last chance for a reform is now,
before the young lose their majority.
These fears are the starting point for this paper. The question is whether a majority still
favors a partial transition to a funded system even without subsidies for private saving and –
if yes, for how long. On the basis of a simple, theoretical approach, we use the CESifo pen-
sion model based on the demographic projections of the German Federal Statistical Office to
answer these questions. This model allows us to calculate the gains and losses for alterna-
tive age cohorts. Under the assumption that all individuals from the age of 18 vote and de-
cide non-altruistically, this model generates a well-founded projection about the political fea-
sibility of reforms and the point of time where the German society becomes a gerontocracy.6
The projection describes the time frame for the transition of the pay-as-you-go system to a
partially funded system.
This paper is in the tradition of Browning (1975), who was the first to analyze the choice
of contribution rates based on simple present value calculations and without taking behav-
ioral reactions into account. In the framework of a median voter model, Browning has shown
that democratic voting leads to an over-provision of social security.
3 Several authors have
dealt with this question within the framework of more and more extensive simulation models
in order to take into account the numerous interactions and interdependencies within and
around the social security system. A special focus is on changes in behavior as reaction to
reforms. Fehr (2000) and Hirte (1999, 2000), for example, analyze the economic effects of
different reform proposals for Germany within a dynamic CGE model. Fehr quantifies the
distributional and efficiency effects of some recently discussed reforms in Germany without,
however, analyzing the political feasibility of the proposals. Hirte includes the question of the
political feasibility into his retrospective analysis of reforms enacted during the 1990s. He
also emphasizes this aspect when looking at privatizing old-age insurance where he does
not  find a majority for a partial or full transition to a funded system against the alternative of
the pension system of 1992. This result changes only when introducing a pre-announcement
period between 15 and 25 years thus altering the timing of the reforms and shifting the bur-
den of the transition to later generations.
Galasso (1999) focuses on some demographic, economic, and political aspects of the
reform debate in the United States determining for different scenarios the social security
                                                
3 This fundamental model has been enlarged in many ways. For an overview see Breyer (1994) and
Myles (1995).7
system that would arise as an equilibrium outcome of an election. For given realizations of
the demographic and economic variables, a system is then sustainable if it implements this
equilibrium tax rate. By adopting this equilibrium concept, he abstracts from transitional as-
pects excluding a politically relevant aspect of the debate.
Bütler (2000) looks at reform proposals for Switzerland given the demographic situation
of 2005. She analyses the feasibility of different reforms for different adjustment mechanisms
as to the governmental budget constraint by identifying the losers and winners of the re-
forms. In this respect, our approach is similar. However, for the case of Germany, we do not
stop after one year. Instead, we are interested in determining the path of the majorities for or
against a reform of the pension system in order to find out when the majority shifts.
4 It is not
only important to know whether a reform is feasible today or in the near future. It is also im-
portant to have an idea about the time period within which the reform has to be enacted. To
calculate the time of shifting majorities, we choose a simple present value approach with a
particular focus on the political feasibility of the discussed reform in the next decades. This
allows us to concentrate on  the demographic development and the consequences of having
fewer children and more retirees for the political feasibility of reform proposals.
2. Politically feasible reforms
The problem underlying the political feasibility of a reform which implies the partial transition
to a funded system is that this reform favors generations which are not yet born and there-
                                                
4 See also Sinn and Übelmesser (2000).8
fore cannot vote and burdens the present voters. Thus, it is doubtful whether a structural
majority for reform can ever be found.
The pay-as-you-go system leads to a distribution in favor of the introductory generation
and at the costs of all succeeding generations. Later generations pay for earlier generations
and acquire claims versus the generations following even later. But these claims always con-
sist of only a present value of pension benefits which is too small to offset the contributions.
The pension benefits of a pay-as-you-go system are always smaller than a pension resulting
from an equally high investment on the capital market, because the pension system is a
zero-sum game over the generations, and the introductory gains must be balanced by later
losses. Only a small part of the contributions are equivalent to savings on the capital market.
The rest is an implicit tax which is lost from the point of view of an individual. Today, the part
of the pay-as-you-go contributions which can be called an implicit tax is about 50%, and the
tendency is increasing because of the demographic development. The present value of the
implicit tax which all generations bear is equal to the historical gains of the first, introductory
generation. And at every moment in time in a continuous pay-as-you-go system, the present
value of the then-existing claims, the implicit public debt, matches exactly the present value
of the implicit taxes yet to be paid (Sinn 2000).
This shows the basic problem of the reform. A reform that respects the claims of the al-
ready retired and of those close to retirement, following the arguments of the German Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Research (1998) and Sinn
(1999), makes the working population, which would be the first generation to be affected by
the reform, carry the total implicit tax burden of the transition to a partially funded system.
The implicit tax burden results from the implicit public debt which would have been serviced
by all succeeding generations. A discharge can happen by introducing an explicit tax to fi-
nance the pension system or by continuing payments of contributions which, however, no
longer lead to claims. In both cases, the transition generation has to carry a heavy burden.9
This generation will, therefore, be against the reform. A structural majority for a partial transi-
tion to a funded system cannot be found when the situation of the retired is not changed and
the present working population is the loser.
In order to find a majority for the reform, the transition period could be extended by con-
verting one part of the implicit public debt into an explicit public debt which will be serviced
later. The larger the part of the implicit public debt converted into an explicit debt, the smaller
is the objection of the present working population against the transition to a funded system.
But this undermines the reform. In the extreme case, the transition burden can be stretched
with the help of a clever debt policy in a way which leads to a concurrence of the time path of
the explicit and implicit tax burden of a continuing pay-as-you-go system (Sinn 2000). It is
even possible to ease the burden of the present working population. Then, of course, a ma-
jority would be for the reform, but instead of introducing a partially funded system the pay-as-
you-go system would effectively be expanded, with an explicit tax and an explicit public debt
higher than the respective implicit values that would have prevailed without the reform. This
reform does not achieve its intended results but leads away from a funded system.
In order to find a majority for a partial transition to a funded system, it is necessary to cut
acquired claims and relieve the burden on the working population. In this case, the retired
and almost retired will be against the reform, but the younger electors could be in favor of the
proposed changes because these cuts might reduce  the implicit-taxes to be paid by them.
Young contributors who are freed from contributing to the pension system can save and build
up their own pensions. They gain from the reform because the necessary savings are lower
than the contributions in the present pension system.
The German government seems to have realized this. The Riester Reforms put forward
in 2000 and 2001 aim at easing the burden for the younger members of the working genera-10
tion by reducing the value of the already acquired claims. This is reached by no longer in-
creasing pension benefits in line with net wages.
In this paper we analyze the feasibility of an idealized reform of the Riester type. We,
therefore, clearly abstract from considering efficiency aspects of a partial transition to a
funded system. This question has already been dealt with extensively in various contexts.
5
Our focus is on the distributional effects of a reform between different age cohorts.
6 We as-
sume that the whole time path of the contribution rate without a reform is shifted in a parallel
way. Starting with the year 2001, each year’s contribution rate is set one percentage point
below the contribution rate which would have resulted without a reform. Consequently, the
pay-as-you-go pension benefits fall. The missing pension claims can then be offset by private
savings in a way that corresponds to a partial transition to a funded system.
7 It is interesting
to see whether the reform finds a majority although there are no subsidies included to make
the partial transition to a funded system more attractive. To say it differently, the question is
whether €10 billion in subsidies are necessary for this reform to be feasible.
The distributional effects of a Riester-type reform certainly lead to changes in the be-
havior of the retired and the contributors. One can expect an increasing labor supply and
reduced incentives for early retirement. However, these behavioral changes will not affect
voting behavior because they are second-order effects which – within the framework of our
marginal reform – only lead to negligible utility changes. The calculations, therefore, do not
                                                
5 See, e.g., Breyer (1989) and Fenge (1995).
6 See Besendorfer et al. (1998) who also neglect efficiency considerations and focus on intergene-
rational redistribution effects of various reform proposals. They, however, do not particularly analyze
the feasibility of the proposals.
7 The present value of the cash flow generated by private savings equals zero if we assume equality of
the market interest rate and the discount rate. Thus, the concrete form of the funded system does not
have any effect on the calculations of the distributional effects.11
need an economic optimization model but can be done – without any  loss of generality – by
assuming a given behavior.
To determine whether the majority is in favor of pension cuts or pension increases, we
calculate a "median age" and an "indifference age. The median age is defined as the age
that splits the electors into two equally large groups when they are arranged in ascending
order as to their age. One half of the electors is older than the median age, one half is
younger. In the case of pension reforms which distribute between age cohorts, the median
age plays an important role. A reform will be feasible if and only if the median voter votes in
favor of it. The indifference age is defined in a way that the cohort with this age is not af-
fected by a Riester-type reform. Older cohorts lose and younger cohorts win. The indifferent
cohort loses as much pension claims in present value terms as it saves in contributions.
  For a median age below the indifference age, the young have the majority and a Ri-
ester-type reform can be democratically enforced. The situation would be different though if
the old had the majority. We calculate the median age and the indifference age for alternative
calendar years to see how the chances for a reform may change in the course of time.
3. The median age
For the median age, we use the middle variant of the 8
th coordinated demographic projection
of the German Federal Statistical Office. We assume that the minimum voting age remains at
18 and that an identical share of voters of all age cohorts participate in the election. The
projection contains information about the distribution of the population over different age co-12
horts for every calendar year. With the help of this information it is possible to calculate the
median age which splits the distribution of voters into two equally large parts.
8 






















































Legend: The data are based on German citizens of the year 2000, their descendents,
  and naturalized foreigners.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994), Statistisches Bundesamt (1997), own calcula-
tions.
According to our calculations, the median age of German voters is currently 47 years.
There are as many voters younger as older than 47. A party that represents the interests of
the 47-year old has a strategic majority compared to other parties. Of course, the median
age is changing rapidly because of the already mentioned decrease in fertility and increase
in life expectancy. This demographic development will shift the age distribution of the Ger-
man population to higher and higher levels in the course of the next decades. Figure 2 dis-
                                                
8 One difficulty of the calculations is the question how the result changes by allowing for immigration
and naturalization. We assume a yearly migration surplus of 200 000 according to the middle variant
of the demographic projections of the German Federal Statistical Office, and a yearly rate of naturali-
zation of 4% of the given foreign population. This corresponds to the average rate of naturalization of
the years 1994-1997. We further assume that the voting behavior of a foreign-born is identical to a
German-born as to the evaluation of pension reforms.13
plays the time path of the median age from 2000 to 2050. It can easily be seen that the me-
dian age is 50 in 2012 and goes up to 54 in 2030. In 30 years, the decisive age cohort will be
seven years older than today. This will strengthen the position of those who are in favor of an
extension of the present pay-as-you-go pension system.
4. The indifference age
To calculate the indifference age, we use the CESifo pension model which has already
served as the basis for the calculations of the German Council of Economic Advisors to the
Federal Ministry of Economics and Research (1998). This model also relies on the middle
variant of the 8
th coordinated demographic projection of the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice. Some additional assumptions have been made such as a growth rate of 2% of the net
wages and a strict equivalence between contributions and pension benefits.
We calculate the effects of a cut in contributions for alternative age cohorts and calendar
years. A special focus is on the effect of the cut in contributions on  a generation’s present
value of the cash flow  which accrues from the chosen calendar year until the expected year
of death. For a positive present value, we assume a vote in favor of the reform and for a
negative present value, we expect a vote against the reform. As already mentioned, we as-
sume that the contribution rate in this and in all succeeding calendar years is one percentage
point below the contribution rate without any reform and that the pension benefits are
adapted accordingly.
Until retirement age, this reform eases the financial burden of the contributors. After re-
tirement, however, the retirees face lower pension benefits. For a young cohort, the positive
effect on the contributions dominates,  because, as explained above, a normal generation in
an ongoing pay-as-you-go system faces a net loss in present value terms which matches the
introductory gains. However, for a cohort close to the retirement age, the negative effect on14
pension benefits dominates. The cohort for which the present value of the changes in the
cash flow is closest to zero is the indifferent cohort. The age of this cohort is the indifference
age of the respective calendar year. Repeating these calculations for alternative calendar
years yields the time path of the indifference age as shown in Figure 3.






















































Preference for expanding 
the pay-as-you-go system
Preference for reducing 
the pay-as-you-go system
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994), own calculations.
In 2000, the indifference age was 48. Younger individuals should demand a cut of pay-
as-you-go benefits. The lower these benefits are, the easier it is for the younger individuals to
get rid – at the cost of the older individuals – of the implicit tax in the contributions. Con-
versely, individuals older than 48 should be in favor of an extension or at least of the mainte-
nance of the present level of the pay-as-you-go system. The higher the contribution rate, the
higher are the pension benefits and the higher is the part of the implicit tax burden which can
be shifted to the younger contributors.15
The indifference age will increase by five years until 2013. This increase results from the
growing demographic crisis. The number of retirees rises more and more relative to the
number of contributors. This deteriorates the situation of the contributors around the age of
50 and leads to a rising number of contributors who prefer to abolish the pay-as-you-go sys-
tem.
The indifference age reaches a maximum of 53 in 2014 and falls from 2024 on. Those
who are 53 in 2024 can be more optimistic concerning their pensions. They know that they
will retire at the peak of the pension crisis, but they also know that the situation will relax in
the years to come. This makes this cohort hope for higher pension benefits relative to the
incomes than the pension benefits for these cohorts that retire at the beginning of the 2030s.
5. Germany's last chance
A comparison of Figures 2 and 3, as displayed in Figure 4, shows that the indifference age
today and up to the middle of the second decade of the new millennium exceeds the median
age. Thus, in a sense, the young outweigh the old, and there is a majority for a Riester-type
reform towards a partially funded pension system even if the subsidies of €10 billions a year
were not granted. The majority, however, is slight. According to our calculations,  53.2% of
the eligible voters gain from such a reform whereas 46.8% lose.
This majority will, however, vanish around 2023, as Figure 4 shows, when the time path
of the median age cuts the time path of the indifference age from below. In 2027, the median
age will already exceed the indifference age by 4 years and the majority of those who are in
favor of an extension of the pay-as-you-go system  system will be 55.5%. Then, Germany
gets trapped in its pension system, unable to further reforms in the direction of funding. In
fact, the country will have reached a situation which can be called a gerontocracy.16
The reason for why Germany gets trapped can be seen in a  phase-shifting between
both curves. The curve of the median age reflects more or less the curve of the dependency
ratio of the German population (see Figure 1). The curve of the indifference age anticipates,
however, the curve of the dependency ratio and displays the end of the pension crisis earlier
because the situation during the retirement period is part of the calculations of the indifferent
individual. Thus, there is a period after the year 2023 where the group of people who put
their hope in the pension system outweighs those who fear this system, and in this period a
funding of pensions which effectively comes along with a pension cut, will be difficult if not
impossible.





















































Indifference age Median age
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994), Statistisches Bundesamt (1997), own calculations.
6. Concluding remarks
For Germany, the beginning of the 2020s of the new millennium – to be more precise the
year 2023 – will be very decisive because this is Germany's last chance for a partial transi-17
tion to a funded pension system. After 2023, the country will be characterized by a geronto-
cratic system where the old decide over the young. Only the fear that the young might emi-
grate – and perhaps a certain altruistic attitude towards their own descendants – might pre-
vent the old from exploiting the young.
Of course, it is possible that many people do not understand what is going on and do not
know  whether they belong to the winners or losers of a pension reform. Therefore, clever
parties might succeed in tricking many voters and in postponing the turning point of the
electoral majority. But this strategy will not succeed forever, and the bigger the lag between
an election year and the year of Germany's last chance, the more difficult it will be to fight
politically against the strategic majorities which will result from the ageing of the German
population. Substantial pension reforms which prevent the collapse of the system should
therefore be executed immediately. With each year, the strategic majority for the pension
reform shrinks.
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